Naval War College Review
Volume 58
Number 1 Winter

Article 6

2005

Hospital Ships in the War on Terror
Richard J. Grunawalt

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Grunawalt, Richard J. (2005) "Hospital Ships in the War on Terror," Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Grunawalt: Hospital Ships in the War on Terror

Professor Grunawalt, professor emeritus of the Naval
War College, is the former director of the Oceans Law
and Policy Department of the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies. His publications include (with John E. King
and Ronald S. McClain) Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict (1996) and Targeting
Enemy Merchant Shipping (1993)—volumes 69 and
65 of the Naval War College International Law Studies
Series.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2005, Vol. 58, No. 1

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 6

HOSPITAL SHIPS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Sanctuaries or Targets?
Richard J. Grunawalt

E

mployment of military hospital ships in support of the war on terror is militarily, politically, and morally appropriate. White ships adorned with the red
cross or red crescent are internationally recognized as protected platforms engaged exclusively in the care and treatment of the casualties of war or the victims
of disaster, whether natural or man-made. Despite the humanity of their mission, outdated rules of conventional and customary international law, designed
for a bygone era, hamper their effectiveness and imperil their safety. This enquiry examines these problems in the context of the war on terror and an adversary intent on destroying such “soft” targets as hospital ships in order to create the
maximum in shock and horror. A brief overview of the development of the law
pertaining to hospital ships is provided as well, with emphasis on rules governing
methods of identification, modes of communication, and means of defense.
EVOLUTION OF LAW AND PRACTICE PERTAINING TO
HOSPITAL SHIPS
The special protected status accorded to hospital ships during international
armed conflict has a long and storied past. The utility of vessels especially designed or equipped to care for and transport wounded and sick soldiers and sailors has an even more extensive history. Indeed, there is some evidence that both
1
the Athenian and Roman fleets employed vessels as hospital ships.
Early Development (1868–1949)
By the seventeenth century, vessels especially configured to care for the wounded
2
following engagements at sea routinely accompanied naval squadrons. Pictet
noted that by the time of the Crimean War (1853–56) “more than 100,000 sick
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and wounded were repatriated to England on board hospital transports. Thereafter, no military expedition was ever undertaken without the necessary ships
being assigned to evacuate soldiers from the combat area and give them the
3
medical treatment they might require.”
It was not until 1868, however, that the international community sought to
cloak ships engaged exclusively in the care and treatment of the wounded, sick,
and shipwrecked with formal immunity from capture and destruction. Following adoption of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded in the Armies in the Field of 1864, a diplomatic conference was
convened in Geneva for the purpose, among others, of extending to naval forces
4
at sea the protections accorded in that treaty to wounded combatants on land.
That effort produced a convention entitled Additional Articles Relating to the
Condition of the Wounded in War of 1868, which was never ratified but set forth
basic precepts that continue to inform the law of armed conflict relative to hos5
pital ships. Principal among them is that “vessels not equipped for fighting
which, during peace the government shall have officially declared to be intended
to serve as floating hospital ships, shall . . . enjoy during the war complete neutrality, both as regards stores, and also as regards their staff, provided that their
equipment is exclusively appropriate to the special service on which they are em6
ployed.” Although it was not in legal force, belligerents in both the Franco-German
War of 1870–71 and the Spanish-American War of 1898 agreed to accept and abide
by the 1868 accord.
By 1898, there was growing recognition of the need to revise and expand the
1864 Convention, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
began the task of drafting an expanded version. This effort was overtaken, however, by the czar of Russia’s initiative to convene the First Hague Peace Conference, which drafted and adopted, among other instruments, the 1899 Hague (II)
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Reg7
ulations Annexed Thereto as well as the 1899 Hague (III) Convention for the
Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of
8
22 August 1864. Given the failure of the 1868 Additional Articles to gain ratification, the Hague (III) Convention was the first successful attempt to extend to
the maritime environment the formal protections applicable to medical facili9
ties and the wounded and sick in the field on land. Article 1 of the latter accord
provides that vessels constructed or assigned solely for use as military hospital
ships, and properly announced as such, “shall be respected and cannot be captured while hostilities last.” Article 4, in turn, stipulates that hospital ships must
accord relief and assistance to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked without discrimination as to nationality, must not be used for “any military purpose,” and
must not “hamper the movements of the combatants.” Article 4 also provides
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that hospital ships are subject to visits, inspections, and some measures of control by the opposing belligerent. Article 5 states that military hospital ships are to
be painted white (with a horizontal green stripe) and fly “the white flag with a
red cross” to identify them as protected vessels.
The 1899 Hague (III) Convention was ratified by the United States in Sep10
tember 1900 and was incorporated into the U.S. Naval War Code of 1900. Articles 21 through 28 of the latter correspond, more or less verbatim, with Articles 1
through 10 of the former.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 provided the first real test of the 1899
Hague (III) Convention. Both Russia and Japan were parties to the treaty, and
both accepted and (for the most part) abided by its terms. There were, however,
allegations of intentional violation. Of particular note was a Russian claim that
the Japanese deliberately fired at Russian hospital ships during the siege of Port
11
Arthur in May 1904, an assertion that the Japanese denied. The following year
the Russian hospital ship Orel was captured and subsequently condemned by a
Japanese prize court for “signaling” and providing other nonmedical services to
12
the Russian fleet in ways that amounted to use for military purposes.
The Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 produced twelve separate conventions, including the 1907 Hague (X) Convention for the Adaptation to Mari13
time Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention. This treaty is
essentially a reiteration of the 1899 Hague (III) Convention with several new articles added for clarity. Most important, for the purposes of this enquiry, is Article 8, which provides:
Hospital ships and sick wards of vessels are no longer entitled to protection if they
are employed for the purpose of injuring the enemy.
The fact of the staff of the said ships and sick wards being armed for maintaining order and for defending the sick and wounded, and the presence of wireless telegraphy
apparatus on board, is not a sufficient reason for withdrawing protection.14

The 1907 Hague (X) Convention continues the 1899 Hague (III) Convention regime with respect to mandatory steps to enhance the identification of hospital
ships—for example, external surfaces painted white with a green stripe, and a
15
white flag with a red cross.
At the outbreak of World War I, the 1899 Hague (III) Convention and the
1907 Hague (X) Convention were recognized by the belligerents of both sides as
governing the use and protection of hospital ships during international armed
conflict. Indeed, these same rules applied during World War II. Although the
Diplomatic Conference of 1929 produced the 1929 Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the
16
Field, which revised and updated the 1906 Convention of the same name, and
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17

the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, efforts to revise the 1906 Hague (X) Convention did not proceed beyond the draft
18
stage before the onset of World War II. Consequently, rules fashioned to accommodate warfare at sea in the nineteenth century were still in place as late as
1949. Indeed, this body of law was arguably obsolete even before the onset of
hostilities in 1914. One observer, writing shortly after the end of World War II,
noted that
the framers of Hague Convention No. X had two main contingencies in mind: the
first was the old-fashioned fleet action fought at short range with bloody carnage and
consequently need for speedy succour of the wounded. Hospital ships were expected
to accompany the fleet to sea and wait on the outskirts of the engagement with a view
to picking up the wounded and drowning, and accordingly required protection while
engaged on their task; thus, too, the obsolete provisions for respecting sick bays look
back to the days when they might have been the scene of hand-to-hand fighting. Secondly, the Convention had to provide for the protection of sick and wounded combatant personnel such as might have been found on board troopers [sic] or merchant
ships intercepted by the enemy. Having safeguarded them, its framers had completed
their task of giving the sailor the protection to which the soldier was already entitled:
they made no provision for the civilian, because none was needed.19

By the advent of World War I, the role of the hospital ship had evolved significantly. No longer hovering at the fringe of battle to attend to stricken seamen after engagements, the hospital ships of that conflict were principally engaged in
the transport of wounded and sick combatants from theaters of operations
ashore to hospital facilities at home—a role not envisioned by the framers of
early conventions. The only specific admonition against using hospital ships for
military purposes set forth in Article 4 of the 1907 Hague (X) Convention is that
against hampering “the movements of the combatants,” clearly a vestige of
close-aboard fleet action of a bygone era. Nonetheless, the belligerents of both
world wars accepted the applicability of Hague (X) to those conflicts, while dif20
fering, often markedly, as to its interpretation.
Practice during World Wars I and II
Many of the problems encountered during both conflicts revolved around the
difficulty of identification. White hulls, green stripes, and the distinctive flag
may have served well in daylight encounters with surface vessels relatively
nearby, but they proved largely ineffective in warfare at sea marked by
long-range surface bombardment and air and subsurface engagements, often
during darkness or in adverse weather conditions. Not surprisingly, damage to
and destruction of hospital ships in both world wars was generally the result of
misidentification, although deliberate attacks certainly did occur. In January
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1917, alleging that British and French hospital ships were being used to transport troops and munitions, Germany announced that it would sink on sight en21
emy hospital ships found in certain designated waters. Both Great Britain and
France denied those allegations, but a number of British and French hospital
ships were in fact sunk by German U-boats. Perhaps most grievous was the sinking of Llandovery Castle on 27 June 1918 by U-86. The British hospital ship
Llandovery Castle was en route to England after delivering wounded and sick Canadian soldiers to Halifax, Nova Scotia, when it was torpedoed and sunk some
116 nautical miles southwest of Ireland. Two hundred thirty-four of its 258 crew
and medical staff perished (there were no patients on board at the time). The
German Supreme Court, in the war crimes trial of two of the U-boat’s officers in
1921, found that
up to the year 1916 the steamer Llandovery Castle had . . . been used for the transport
of troops. In that year she was commissioned by the British Government to carry
wounded and sick Canadian soldiers home to Canada from the European theatre of
war. The vessel was suitably fitted out for the purpose and was provided with the distinguishing marks, which the Tenth Hague Convention . . . requires in the case of naval hospital ships. The name of the vessel was communicated to the enemy Powers.
From that time onward she was exclusively employed in the transport of sick and
wounded. She never again carried troops, and never had taken munitions on board.22

The Court further found that notwithstanding directives from the German
high command that hospital ships (other than those encountered in designated
barred areas) were exempt from capture or destruction,
[the U-boat commander] was of the opinion . . . that on the enemy side, hospital
ships were being used for transporting troops and combatants, as well as munitions.
He, therefore, presumed that, contrary to International Law, a similar use was being
made of the Llandovery Castle. In particular, he seems to have expected she had
American airmen on board. Acting on this suspicion, he decided to torpedo the
ship.23

The first controversy over the protected status of hospital ships in World War
I, however, involved the capture and condemnation as prize of the German auxiliary hospital ship Ophelia in October 1914 by Great Britain. The prize court
found that Ophelia was “adapted and used as a signaling ship for military pur24
poses.” This instance of a hospital ship being used to obtain or transmit information of a military character—reminiscent of the Orel case previously
mentioned—was, at least in part, responsible for the inclusion in Article 34 of
the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention of a specific prohibition of the possession or
use by hospital ships of a “secret code” for communications, a matter more fully
25
addressed below.
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Hospital ships fared significantly better in World War II than in World War I.
The scholar J. C. Mossop has noted:
It is, perhaps, fair to say that during the 1939 war the British Admiralty, the United
States Navy Department, and the German Naval Command respected the Principles
of the [1907] Convention; such abuses as occurred were authorized at a low level and
were corrected when discovered. Despite government statements on both sides there
is little evidence to show that attacks on hospital ships were authorized by the respective commands and much to prove that the majority were accidental and due in the
main to faulty recognition.26

Although Mossop’s observations were addressed principally to the European
theater of operations and war in the Atlantic, the conduct of the belligerents in
the war in the Pacific followed a similar pattern. Violations were reported, both
regarding the misuse of hospital ships to transport combatant personnel and
munitions, and with respect to the intentional targeting of such vessels ostensi27
bly operating in full compliance with the 1907 Hague (X) rules. However, as
was the case in the Atlantic, both sides recognized the practical value of hospital
ships and sought to honor their protected status. In this respect the belligerents
were “principled” adversaries, adhering to basic humanitarian values perceived
to be in their respective interests. This general compliance with the law of naval
warfare was not, then, entirely altruistic. Indeed, the importance of reciprocity
in this calculus is reflected in an exchange of message traffic between Admiral
H. P. Smith, USN, Senior Officer Present of U.S. Naval Forces in the Marianas,
then providing blockade forces in the Bonin Islands, and the Commander in
Chief Pacific. Admiral Smith had expressed his intention to
exercise the privilege accorded in Article 4 of the Hague Convention to divert the
[Japanese] hospital ship, on her departure from Chichi Jima, to Iwo Jima, where I
would conduct an examination.
I was immediately directed by the Commander-in-Chief not to undertake the action
in view of the fact that every effort was being made to avoid any incident regarding
hospital vessels, which might lead to a reprisal against our own.28

The practical difficulties associated with identifying hospital ships were, as
noted above, amply and tragically exemplified in the two world wars. As the role
of long-range artillery, submarines, and attack aircraft expanded exponentially
in war at sea, so too did the likelihood of faulty identification. In recognition of
this reality and the experience of World War I, a committee of experts that convened in Geneva in 1937 to draft revisions to the 1907 Hague (X) Convention
reported:
The development of means of modern warfare (aviation and long-range artillery) has
rendered insufficient the means of identification heretofore provided in the Hague
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Convention. That is why the Commission has believed that it should stipulate the
obligation for hospital ships, in addition to the red band on a white background, to
be furnished on the bridge and the elevated parts with red crosses on a white background clearly visible from any direction whatsoever.29

Due to the onset of World War II, that effort did not come to formal fruition.
However, the need to improve the identification regime for hospital ships was
such that the belligerents adopted the markings proposed in the committee’s report. William Bishop, in a U.S. State Department internal memorandum of 7
May 1943, noted,
It would . . . appear that the provisions of Article 5 of Hague Convention X are being
complied with in the present war, but that there is developing a practice by
belligerents, approved by the International Committee of the Red Cross, of placing
additional markings of red crosses on white backgrounds on their hospital ships. . . .
[Such] additional markings are being used currently on Japanese hospital ships, as
well as on those of the United States, Great Britain, Germany and Italy.30

These initiatives, and others during the course of the conflict, proved to be
very beneficial. Mossop notes that
during the 1939 war additional markings on the sides, stern, and deck of hospital
ships to aid identification by day, and illumination at night with a band of green
lights on the sides and red crosses on the sides and deck picked out with red lamps,
were adopted by common consent and provided a high degree of protection against
underwater attack—although errors are not unknown in practice.31

However, as Mossop also observes,
the advent of the high-level bomber has provided a problem of an entirely different
kind. Existing methods of marking and illumination have proved unsatisfactory even
at close range, and objections raised by local military authorities to the presence inside their ports of illuminated ships have added a complication to an already difficult
problem. At sea and in port accidental attacks on hospital ships have been all too frequent and the casualty lists heavy.32

The issue of effective identification of hospital ships was to remain a matter
of importance in the drafting of postwar rules.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The experience of the two world wars, coupled with the revolution of that era in
naval warfare technology and practice, mandated a thorough overhaul of the
rules pertaining to the protections and obligations of military hospital ships. Accordingly, a diplomatic conference convened in Geneva in early 1949 to revise
and expand the regime for international protection of war victims set about to
include a comprehensive treaty with respect to the maritime environment. It
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produced the Geneva (II) Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
33
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. The 1949
Geneva (II) Convention consists of sixty-three articles, whereas the 1907 Hague
(X) Convention had but twenty-eight: “This extension is mainly due to the fact
that the present Convention [the 1949 Geneva Convention(II)] is conceived as a
complete and independent Convention whereas the 1907 Convention restricted
itself to adapting to maritime warfare the principles of the [1906 Geneva] Con34
vention on the wounded and sick in land warfare.”
Chapter III (Articles 22 through 35) of the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention sets
forth the basic obligations and protections of hospital ships. They are to be pro35
tected at all times “and may in no circumstances be attacked or captured.” This
language makes clear that hospital ships retain their protected status whether or
not they are, at a given moment, engaged in the treatment or transport of casualties. It also clarifies the somewhat archaic wording that hospital ships “shall be
respected,” with the admonition that they may not be “attacked.” Article 22 reflects the actual practice of the world wars in making clear that the permissible
employment of hospital ships includes the transportation as well as the treatment of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, including military members rendered hors de combat in land warfare. Among the clarifications necessitated by
disparate interpretations that surfaced during World War I, and again in World
War II, is the assertion in Article 26 that the protections of the convention extend to hospital ships of any tonnage, as well as to their lifeboats.
Of particular relevance to this enquiry are those provisions of the convention
that address the circumstances or actions that may lead to loss of protection. Article 30 sets forth the basic premise that hospital ships are not to be used for any
military purpose other than, of course, the care and transport of casualties.
Moreover, they “shall in no wise hamper the movement of the combatants.” Article 30 also postulates, however, that “during and after an engagement” hospital
ships “act at their own risk.” Pictet, in his analysis of this latter provision, noted
that
in 1937, the question was raised as to whether a hospital ship should not waive the
protection of the Convention when being escorted by warships since it would then
no longer be possible to stop and search it. In fact that was the position taken by certain countries during the Second World War. A hospital ship is obviously bound to
36
lose its immunity under the Convention if it is being escorted by warships.

However, in a footnote accompanying that assertion, Pictet added: “Which does
not mean that the humanitarian principles would not be applied in such a case,
37
or that one would be justified in deliberately firing on the hospital ship.”
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This rather confusing commentary is clarified in the ensuing paragraph, in
which Pictet postulated that “if hospital ships draw near to warships, they do not
lose their protection of the Convention but they may in fact expose themselves
to danger.” Clearly, warships in proximity to hospital ships do not thereby somehow assume immunity from attack; conversely, hospital ships do not lose their
immunity when in the presence of warships. The language of Article 30 should
be read in that sense, whether or not the hospital ship is under warship convoy.
The likelihood that a hospital ship may be engaged in some nefarious purpose
while under escort is so remote that any doctrine justifying its attack solely on
the ground that the intercepting force is denied the opportunity to stop and
search it becomes, in my view, indefensible.
Article 34 of the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention provides, in pertinent part,
The protection to which hospital ships and sick-bays are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the
enemy.
. . . In particular, hospital ships may not possess or use a secret code for their wireless
or other means of communication.

Pictet, in his commentary on Article 34, stated that the term “acts harmful to the
enemy” is “self evident and must remain quite general,” noting that such acts include “carrying combatants or arms, transmitting military information by radio, or deliberately providing cover for a warship.” He added,
The fact that the use of any secret code is prohibited affords a guarantee to the
belligerents that hospital ships will not make improper use of their transmitting apparatus or any other means of communication. Hospital ships may only communicate in clear, or at least in a code that is universally known, and rightly so, for the
spirit of the Geneva Conventions requires that there should be nothing secret in their
behaviour viz-à-viz the enemy.38

Unfortunately, this desire to avoid any possibility of using a hospital ship’s
communications suite in a manner harmful to the enemy, as was the case with
39
the Orel in 1904, created a major problem for contemporary naval practice. In
order to carry out fully their humanitarian functions, hospital ships must be
able to proceed to designated pickup points to evacuate wounded and sick personnel from facilities ashore and to rendezvous with combatant units at sea
when and where necessary to embark casualties. To do so without providing
critical military information to the enemy obviously requires the use of encrypted communications. The experience of the Royal Navy in the Falklands/
Malvinas conflict of 1982 illustrates the point. The legal expert Philippe Eberlin
has described the practical difficulties encountered:
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All communications were made in clear. As the use of secret codes is banned by Article 34 of the Second Convention, the radio communications exchanged by the hospital ships with their land bases were also in clear. It was not possible for them to
communicate directly with the warships, since any communication in clear could reveal the warship’s position to the adversary. Consequently the hospital ships were not
informed about the movements of the fleet or about the development of military operations on land, and thus had to wait in readiness in a zone known as the “Red
Cross Box,” which could be equated with a neutralized zone. . . .
To maintain long distance contact with their bases, the . . . hospital ships used radio
telex via the Inmarsat satellite system. Telex messages were likewise exchanged in the
clear, which meant that the hospital ships could not be informed in detail about the
medical evacuations in which they were required to participate. . . . The Naval Command, from which the hospital ship received its orders, could not use coded radio
communications to inform it directly, and thus rapidly, about the military situation
and dangers in the area where it was operating, nor about the numbers of casualties
40
to be evacuated, the wounds sustained, emergency cases, etc.

It should be noted that the drafters of Article 34 were aware of at least some of
the difficulties that were to be encountered in its application. Resolution 6 of the
diplomatic conference that produced the 1949 Geneva Conventions states:
Whereas the present Conference has not been able to raise the question of the technical study of means of communication between hospital ships, on the one hand, and
warships and military aircraft, on the other, since that study went beyond its terms of
reference;
Whereas this question is of the greatest importance for the safety and efficient operation of hospital ships, the Conference recommends that the High Contracting Parties
will, in the near future, instruct a Committee of Experts to examine technical improvements of modern means of communication between hospital ships, on the one
hand, and warships and military aircraft, on the other, and also to study the possibility of drawing up an International Code laying down precise regulations for the use
of those means, in order that hospital ships may be assured of the maximum protection and be enabled to operate with the maximum efficiency.41

This recommendation proved to be easier said than done. Unfortunately, the
prohibition on the use of “secret codes” remains a serious problem for contemporary practice; it will be addressed further below.
Specific conditions set forth in Article 35 that do not deprive hospital ships of
their protections include:

• Arming of crew members for the purpose of maintaining order, for their
own defense or for the defense of the wounded and sick
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• The presence on board of apparatus exclusively intended to facilitate
navigation or communication

43

• Portable arms and ammunition taken from the wounded and sick
• Care of wounded, sick and shipwrecked civilians
• Transport of equipment and personnel intended exclusively for medical
duties.

44

The first condition cited, arming crew members, is essentially the same as that
set forth in Article 8 of the 1907 Hague (X) Convention. While it is premised on
an outdated view of the employment of hospital ships in naval warfare, it retains
some contemporary utility with respect to the possible boarding of such vessels
by terrorists, pirates, or other unauthorized forces.
Article 43 of the 1949 Geneva II Convention addresses the distinctive markings to be used to identify hospital ships. Pictet commented, “It is clear from the
records that the lack of an up-to-date system of marking, visible at a great distance, was the cause of most of the attacks made on hospital ships during the Second World War. [T]he Diplomatic Conference therefore adopted far-reaching
amendments to the 1907 text.”
However, the improvements that were attained remained in the realm of what
was to be painted how large and in what color—not solutions of problems associated with high-altitude bombers, let alone beyond-visual-range projectiles
and missiles—considerations that even then were beginning to dominate war at
sea. Article 43 provides, in pertinent part, that
the [hospital] ships . . . shall be distinctively marked as follows:
(a) All exterior surfaces shall be white.
(b) One or more dark red crosses, as large as possible, shall be painted and displayed
on each side of the hull and on the horizontal surfaces, so placed as to afford the
greatest possible visibility from the sea and from the air.
All hospital ships shall make themselves known by hoisting their national flag. . . . A
white flag with a red cross shall be flown at the mainmast as high as possible.45

Comprehensive improvements in the regime for identification of hospital
ships were not formally achieved until the coming into force of Additional Protocol I and its annexes.
Additional Protocol I of 1977
The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(known simply as “Additional Protocol I”), has its origins in conferences of government experts under the auspices of the ICRC between 1974 and 1977. That
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effort produced a draft treaty that was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference at
46
Geneva on 8 June 1977 and opened for signature on 12 December of that year.
Additional Protocol I does not address the rules of international law applicable
in war at sea, except as the conflict affects the civilian population on land (naval
47
and air bombardment from sea to shore, etc.); however, it does pertain to the
protection of the victims of international armed conflict, including wounded,
sick, and shipwrecked personnel—and, therefore, hospital ships.
The provisions of Additional Protocol I bearing on this enquiry include Article 22 (1), which stipulates that hospital ships may care for and transport civilian
sick, wounded, and shipwrecked persons; and Annex I, which provides technical
regulations for the marking and identification of hospital ships, among other
things. The inclusion of civilian casualties reflected the practice of both world
wars and was not controversial. Annex I, while adopted by consensus by the Diplomatic Conference, nonetheless poses some problems in its implementation.
Chapter III of Annex I, “Distinctive Signals,” begins by asserting that use of
the signals “is optional” (Article 5). Article 6 addresses a signal specifically for
medical aircraft (a flashing blue light) but states that it may also be employed on
other medical transports, including hospital ships. Article 7 prescribes an identifying radio message, preceded by a distinctive priority signal, for use exclusively by medical transports: call sign, position, and type; intended route, times
of departure and arrival; and other relevant information, such as flight altitude,
radio frequencies being guarded, and “secondary surveillance radar” (below)
modes and codes. These messages are to be transmitted in English at appropriate
48
intervals on an agreed frequency. Article 8, in turn, establishes the secondary
49
surveillance radar (SSR) system for identifying medical aircraft; the parties to a
conflict may agree to use the SSR system on hospital ships as well. Finally, Article
9 (as amended on 30 November 1993) provides in part that:
3. It should be possible for medical transports to be identified by submarines by the
appropriate underwater acoustic signals transmitted by the medical transports.
The underwater acoustic signal shall consist of the call sign . . . of the ship preceded
by the single group YYY transmitted in Morse on an appropriate acoustic frequency,
e.g. 5 kHz.
Parties to a conflict wishing to use the underwater acoustic signal . . . shall inform the
Parties concerned of the signal as soon as possible, and shall . . . confirm the frequency to be employed.50

The effectiveness and efficiency of the distinctive signals regime of Annex I
have, of course, yet to be tested in the crucible of combat at sea. Given that adoption by the parties to Additional Protocol I of the various signals in Chapter III
of Annex I is optional, and that hospital ships are today few in number, these
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technical means of identification will likely remain untested under wartime
conditions for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, in an effort to optimize these
provisions, the ICRC published in 1990 its Manual for the Use of Technical Means
of Identification. W. E. M. Heintschel von Heinegg (the Naval War College’s
Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law for 2003–2004) has observed that “in modern warfare, which is characterized by the use of electronic
means of warfare, these additional technical means of identification are essential for minimizing the danger of mistaken attacks. . . . In view of modern weapons technology the methods recommended [in the 1990 manual] are, however,
51
only a first step in the right direction.”
Assuming that these distinctive signals do prove effective in combat, there remains the potential for abuse, particularly with respect to the underwater acoustic signal concept set forth in Article 9 (as amended). However, attempts by
vessels to pose as hospital ships are not likely in the war on terror and so will not
be further pursued here.
The San Remo Manual of 1994
The purpose of the manual is to provide a contemporary restatement of international law applicable to armed conflicts at sea.
A contemporary manual was considered necessary because of developments in the
law since 1913 that for the most part have not been incorporated into recent treaty
law, the Second Geneva Convention of 1949 being essentially limited to the protection of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea. In particular, there has not been a
development for the law of armed conflict at sea similar to that for the law of armed
conflict on land with the conclusion of Protocol I of 1977 additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.52

The international-law specialists and naval experts from twenty-two different nations who produced the San Remo Manual did so in their individual,
rather than official, capacities. Nonetheless, the manual is widely regarded as authoritative in its articulation of both the customary and conventional law of naval warfare. Accordingly, its rendering of the rules pertaining to cryptographic
communications, defensive armament, and means of identification for hospital
ships—the three principal areas of this enquiry into the employment of hospital
ships in the war on terror—are particularly germane.
Article 171 of the San Remo Manual represents a fairly sharp departure from
existing conventional law with respect to cryptographic equipment on hospital
ships. Article 34 of the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention not only specifically prohibits the possession by hospital ships of “a secret code for their wireless or other
means of communication” but does so in the context of “acts harmful to the enemy” that trigger loss of immunity from attack, albeit only after due warning
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53

and failure to take remedial action. The practical difficulties with adherence to
this prohibition in the modern age have been addressed above in connection
with the Falklands/Malvinas War; it comes as no surprise that the drafters of the
new manual concluded that Article 34 is no longer workable:
Technology has changed since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions. All messages
to and from warships, including unclassified messages are nowadays automatically
encrypted when sent and decrypted when received by communication equipment
that organically includes the crypto function. Hospital ships, therefore, should have
the same type of communication equipment to avoid delays in receiving vital information caused by having separate and outdated radio equipment that does not have
the integral crypto function.54

Accordingly, Article 171 of the manual provides that “in order to fulfill most effectively their humanitarian mission, hospital ships should be permitted to use
cryptographic equipment. The equipment shall not be used in any circumstances to transmit intelligence data nor in any way to acquire any military
advantage” [emphasis added]. This formulation is an expression of what the
drafters considered the law ought to be, not what it is. Nonetheless, it is certainly
welcome as a step in the right direction.
The manual also takes a more realistic approach to the need for hospital ships
to possess at least some means of self-defense. Long-standing conventional law
55
prohibits “acts harmful to the enemy” by hospital ships. While those proscriptions are silent as to the means that may be employed to defend the ship itself (as
opposed to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked being cared for on board), it is
clear that offensive capability is impermissible. Indeed, interpretation of conventional law in this respect has historically been very restrictive, not even allowing a modicum of self-defense capability, beyond small arms to protect
casualties and medical staff. This hesitation stems from the obligation of hospital ships to submit to boarding and inspection by warships of the opposing
party; weapons sufficient to thwart such boardings would pose potential for
56
abuse. This restrictive interpretation is reflected in the military manuals cur57
rently in use by most navies. Again, this is very understandable. In the abstract,
there is a reluctance to take any initiative that could possibly lead to loss of
immunity.
Article 170 of the San Remo Manual provides that “hospital ships may be
equipped with purely deflective means of defence, such as chaff and flares. The
presence of such equipment should be notified.” The explanation accompanying
this provision states:
As there is no prohibition on hospital ships defending themselves, it would be unreasonable not to allow them to do so as long as it is in a way that cannot be interpreted
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as being potentially aggressive. In particular, with modern means of warfare, it is
quite likely that a missile could be deflected from a military target using its deflective
means of defence, and that the missile would then find a ship without such means,
namely, hospital ships. As hospital ships are likely to be in the vicinity of warships,
the chances of their being hit in this way are quite high and not allowing them this
means of defence would mean that they are more likely to be hit than warships,
which would be an absurd result. . . .
This paragraph is formulated in a way as to leave no doubt that hospital ships can
only use deflective means of defence, and not means that could be used in an offensive fashion, such as antiaircraft guns.58

This provision is also a welcome contribution. However, as will be discussed
below in the context of the war on terror, much remains to be done if hospital
ships are to be given a realistic chance to survive an attack, whether intentional
or inadvertent.
With respect to identification, the manual provides in Article 172 that “hospital ships . . . are encouraged to implement the means of identification set out
in Annex I of Additional Protocol I of 1977.” Article 173, in turn, states, “These
means of identification are intended only to facilitate identification and do not,
of themselves, confer immunity.” It is important here to bear in mind that the
distinctive signals set out in Annex I are optional. Not using them does not deprive an otherwise protected platform of immunity from attack.
U.S. NAVY HOSPITAL SHIPS: CONTEMPORARY CAPABILITY,
DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE
The concept of employment of U.S. Navy hospital ships is officially characterized as follows:
Hospital ships are flexible, capable and unique Navy HSS [health service support] assets that can be used in joint operations or combined/coalition wartime operations
and peacetime operations. They are well suited for joint operations with a naval component because of their self-sustainability. They can be employed in war operations
and in certain military peacetime operations, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In peacetime operations, the hospital ship may operate independently or
as part of a joint or coalition force. Hospital ships are designed for operations of a
long-term nature (i.e., 60 days or longer, 30 days without major resupply).59

U.S. Navy Hospital Ship Capability
The primary mission of a U.S. Navy hospital ship is to:
Provide rapid, flexible, and mobile acute medical care to support a Marine air/
ground task force (MAGTF) deployed ashore, Army and Air Force units deployed
ashore, and naval amphibious task forces and battle forces afloat. Operations are
governed by the principles of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
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Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea of
12 August 1949.

As a secondary mission, the ships (with appropriate tailoring of manning,
medical material/equipment, and provisions) are capable of providing mobile
surgical hospital service for use by U.S. government agencies involved in disaster
or humanitarian relief, or of limited humanitarian care incident to these mis60
sions or to peacetime military operations.
The U.S. Navy currently has two hospital ships in active status, USNS Mercy
61
(T-AH 19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH 20). They joined the fleet in 1986 and
1987, respectively. Both are converted San Clemente–class commercial
supertankers with a full-load displacement of 69,360 tons and an overall length
of 894 feet. They have a range of thirteen thousand nautical miles at 17.5 knots.
Each is manned (when activated) with a civilian master and sixty-three civilian
mariners, as well as fifty-eight Navy communications and support personnel.
Upon full mobilization, each ship would be staffed by an additional 1,100 medical/
dental personnel. However, that number can be significantly lower, depending
on the mission. As an example, Mercy operated in the Philippines as a hospital
facility in 1987 with a medical/dental complement of just 375 personnel, treating over sixty-three thousand patients during a three-month deployment. Both
Mercy and Comfort boast twelve operating theaters, four X-ray rooms, a pharmacy, and a blood bank. They each have an eighty-bed intensive care unit and
920 other patient beds to accommodate intermediate and minimal-care casualties. Mercy and Comfort are maintained in a “reduced operational status,” Mercy
in San Diego and Comfort in Baltimore. They can be fully activated and crewed
62
within five days.
Without question, the Mercy-class hospital ship represents a formidable capability in the treatment and care of casualties in the numbers that may be encountered in the course of the war on terror, whether or not weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) fall into the hands of, or are employed by, al-Qa‘ida or
other terrorist entities. Obviously, mass casualties can result from conventional
weapons and devices—witness the destruction of the Marine barracks in Beirut
in 1983; the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995; the Khobar Towers in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996; Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in
1988; the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; the World Trade Center
in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, in 2001; the nightclub
in Kuda, Bali, in 2002; and the train in Madrid, Spain, in 2004, to cite but a few
such attacks. Nonetheless, the potential carnage from a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack makes WMD a terrorist threat of another order of magnitude.
Nonetheless, whether attacks are conventional or unconventional, the
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importance of the humanitarian contribution that platforms such as Mercy and
Comfort can make in the war on terror is apparent.
Recent Practice and Current Doctrine
Both Comfort and Mercy were activated in August 1990 and deployed to the Persian Gulf in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Comfort
was also activated in 1994 during the Haitian crisis to process refugees in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and again in 1998 to participate in BALTIC CHAL63
LENGE 98, a NATO Partnership for Peace exercise in the Baltic Sea. More
recently, Comfort was deployed to New York Harbor in the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade Center in September 2001 and, in January 2003, to
the Persian Gulf in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Comfort’s deployment following 9/11 illustrates the versatility of this class of
ship. On departure from Baltimore on 12 September, Comfort was assigned to
provide emergency medical assistance to victims of the terrorist attack. However,
by the time the ship arrived on station, its mission had been changed to providing
64
logistical and hotel services support to firefighters and emergency personnel. In
January 2003, Comfort returned to its primary mission while deployed in support
of IRAQI FREEDOM, treating more than 650 battle-related casualties, including
65
about two hundred Iraqi prisoners of war and Iraqi civilians.
Current doctrine regarding identification of U.S. Navy hospital ships is premised on applicable provisions of the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention, in accordance with which such vessels (hospital ships and lifeboats) are “conspicuously
marked. They are painted white with dark red crosses painted on their bow, side,
stern, and horizontal surfaces for recognition from the air and sea. The red
crosses should be illuminated at night. A hospital ship must fly its national flag
66
and a white flag with a red cross at the main mast.”
To my knowledge, Navy doctrinal publications make no mention of the distinctive electronic identification signals outlined in Annex I to Additional Protocol I—flashing blue lights, priority radio signals, SSR modes and codes, or
67
underwater acoustic signals. However, flashing blue lights and the SSR system
are in fact installed in Comfort, although the underwater acoustic signal system
68
is not. This is not surprising, in that the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, the distinctive signals regime of Annex I being optional in any
event. Moreover, in the war on terror it is not at all clear that such signals would
serve any useful purpose.
As regards the employment of cryptographic communications equipment in
U.S. hospital ships, U.S. Navy doctrine continues to recite the 1949 Geneva II
Convention prohibitions on the use of “secret codes”:
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The second paragraph of Article 34 of GWS-Sea [i.e., the 1949 Geneva II Convention] provides that hospital ships may not possess or use a secret code for their wireless or other means of communication. This proscription may include many types of
encryption devices that are common to many means of modern communication.
United States policy is to follow all provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including
the prohibition on use of secure and encrypted communications aboard hospital
ships.
The technological requirements of modern communications have clearly rendered
this provision of GWS-Sea outdated. . . . [M]ost modern communications and navigation systems, including satellite systems, use some form of encryption even at the
most basic level. While avoiding all use of encrypted equipment may be problematic,
the prohibition contained in the Geneva Convention requires extreme vigilance in
69
ensuring that hospital ships do not lose their protected status.

This formulation is reflective of existing conventional law. However, as discussed above, compliance with these dictates poses severe practical problems for
hospital ships in the modern era. Actual U.S. Navy practice reflects a more flexible approach. Michael Sirak, writing for Jane’s Defence Weekly, has reported that
encrypted communications devices were installed in Comfort before deployment to the Middle East in January 2003:
USN officials argue that the rules preventing hospital ships from using encrypted
communications devices—contained principally in the Second Geneva Convention
of 1949—do not adequately account for technological advancements, such as satellite
communications, which are today regarded as vital for these vessels to function effectively. “The way most naval warships communicate now is done on a level that even
the most simple communications have some level of encryption,” said one Navy official. “Even the actual navigation of the ship can sometimes be in jeopardy if you cannot use these encrypted forms of communication.”70

Assuming this report is accurate, and I have no doubt that it is, the U.S. Navy has
exercised very good sense in equipping Comfort with encrypted communications prior to deployment for IRAQI FREEDOM.
Current U.S. Navy doctrine respecting the placement of weapons in hospital
ships notes that such ships lose their protection if they engage in hostile acts but
that arming crews for the maintenance of order, for their own defense or that of
the sick and wounded, does not deprive hospital ships of the protection other71
wise due them. As noted above, this formulation, taken from the 1949 Geneva
(II) Convention, has historically been interpreted to mean that only light individual weapons may be employed.
Contemporary U.S. Navy practice is more realistic. Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that .50-caliber machine guns were installed on Comfort prior to its deployment in support of IRAQI FREEDOM:

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

19

Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 6
GRUNAWALT

107

USN officials say the small arms currently allowed on hospital ships, such as side
arms and rifles, are not enough to thwart an attack by a non-state actor like a terrorist group. They say the limited protection afforded to these vessels under international law would be unlikely to deter terrorists and, unlike lawful belligerents,
terrorists would consider them an attractive “soft” target. Therefore, they argue that
it is necessary to place “crew-served” weapons like .30-cal. and .50-cal. machine guns
on them, exclusively for defence, to fend off attacks by swarming, heavily armed
72
speed boats or suicide craft.

Again, I have no doubt that this report is correct. Indeed, it would have been
inexcusable if Comfort had been dispatched to the Arabian Gulf, and thereby
placed in harm’s way, without at least this modicum of self-protection.
ASSESSMENT, RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSALS, AND OPTIONS
Both the conventional and customary law of international armed conflict cloaks
hospital ships with immunity from capture or attack. This humanitarian dictate
is premised on the principle that unnecessary suffering and destruction in
armed conflict serves no valid military purpose and, accordingly, is to be minimized as much as possible.
Identification of Hospital Ships in the War on Terror
Wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military members, and the medical personnel
who care for them, are considered noncombatants and therefore not subject to
direct attack. Hospital ships caring for and transporting casualties of war enjoy
immunity from deliberate attack, provided they are identifiable as such—hence
the rules regarding distinctive markings, emblems, and signals. As this article
has noted, most of the damage and destruction inflicted on hospital ships in past
conflicts was the result of misidentification, a problem that has intensified in
this era of beyond-visual-range targeting.
However, the notion that hospital ships will not be intentionally attacked if
they can be properly identified is premised on the assumption that the adversary
is principled. Members of the armed forces of sovereign states engaged in armed
conflict are presumably fully conversant with the law of armed conflict and dedicated to compliance with it. Indeed, notwithstanding the carnage of the wars of
the twentieth century, there was a decided effort by most, if not all, participating
states to respect the law of armed conflict. The war on terror presents a far different paradigm. A terrorist organization, whether composed of nonstate actors or
clandestine operatives of sovereign entities, is by definition an unprincipled adversary, with the will to target intentionally noncombatant personnel, facilities,
and activities, both civilian and military. They consider protected places and
platforms targets of choice, both for their vulnerability and the shock value
of their destruction. In this context, effective identification of hospital ships
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becomes academic—in the war on terror, hospital ships may be targeted because
they are hospital ships. It is perhaps not unreasonable, then, to question the wisdom of painting them white, adorning them with red crosses or crescents, and illuminating them at night.
At this juncture it would be well to remember that the essence of the law is
protection of the humanitarian function performed by the platform, not its
coating of paint or the symbols it displays. A vessel devoted exclusively to the
care and transport of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked personnel, and understood by an adversary to be so employed, is protected under the law whether it is
73
painted white, green, or haze gray. If identification worsens the vulnerability of
a hospital ship to attack, a fresh coat of paint offers little comfort.
That said, however, I am not a proponent of removing protective markings
from U.S. Navy hospital ships in the war on terror, provided they are defended by
accompanying combatants or are equipped to protect themselves from attack,
deliberate or inadvertent. In my view, the distinctive painting and the prominent display of the protective symbol serve a purpose beyond that of reducing
the likelihood of inadvertent attack by a principled adversary. Hospital ships are
symbolic of our humanity, in many ways. They provide hope and comfort simply by their visible presence. This is particularly so in an era of mass casualties
inflicted by terrorists on innocent men, women, and children. In a world beset
by savagery, hospital ships are internationally recognized as a potent moral
force. We ought not to give that up lightly.
Encrypted Communications in Hospital Ships in the Twenty-first Century
As noted above, current U.S. Navy doctrine prohibits the possession or use by
hospital ships of any cryptographic means of communications during armed
conflict. While recent practice has somewhat eased that total proscription, the
problem remains. The genesis of these constraints involves a few isolated incidents many years ago when hospital ships were alleged to have used coded wireless communications capability to transmit operational intelligence, a “military
purpose” use inconsistent with their protected status and in violation of the
1899 Hague (III) Convention and the 1907 Hague (X) Convention. In an effort
to prohibit such acts more clearly, the drafters of the 1949 Geneva (II) Convention created the “secret codes” prohibition of Article 34, discussed above, which
now frustrates the effective and efficient operation of hospital ships. Moreover,
combatant and logistic-support ships and aircraft transporting casualties to a
hospital ship remain targetable. If such platforms communicate in the clear, they
may reveal information that would help the enemy target not only themselves
but the rendezvous location, thereby endangering the hospital ship as well.
Domestic law considerations also are at issue in that Federal medical privacy
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standards mandate the protection of health information of individuals, necessitating employment of secure means for the transmission of medical data. In
short, compliance with the “secret codes” prohibition of Article 34 of the 1949
Geneva (II) Convention seriously degrades the ability of modern hospital ships
to carry out their humanitarian mission, not only during the war on terror, but
generally.
The time has now come to abandon formally U.S. Navy adherence to the prohibition of the possession and use by hospital ships of encrypted communications, whether for reception or transmission. Obviously, the conventional and
customary rules mandating that hospital ships not be used for any military purpose other than the care and transport of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked
must remain inviolable. However, the likelihood that a hospital ship would be
employed to collect and promulgate military intelligence in this age of satellite
sensors, over-the-horizon radar, and fixed and mobile long-range hydrophones
is extremely remote; it strains the imagination to conjure up a scenario where it
would have any utility whatsoever. In my view, this is yet another instance of a
convention provision that no longer serves the purpose for which it was intended and that adherence to which works at cross purposes with the greater
good envisioned by the treaty as a whole. I applaud the U.S. Navy’s reported decision to equip Comfort with cryptographic communications in January 2003;
additionally, however, naval doctrinal publications should be modified accordingly and the international community informed. Lest anyone doubt the legitimacy of its purpose, the U.S. Navy should publicly reaffirm its adherence to the
mandate that hospital ships not be utilized for military purposes in any way
harmful to a potential adversary. To this end, the right of a principled adversary
to board and inspect, and the presence on board of a neutral observer, should, in
my view, both be specifically endorsed.
Defensive Arming of Hospital Ships in the War on Terror
Given that existing conventional law is silent with respect to the means that hospital ships may lawfully employ in their own defense, it is somewhat anomalous
that the U.S. Navy, and modern navies in general, find the issue so difficult to address. I believe that there are two principal reasons for this hesitance. The first is
that protected places, persons, and things historically have been by their very nature vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability, in turn, has been viewed as an assurance of their benign status; consequently, there can be no legitimate reason
for a principled adversary to attack them. The personnel, assets, and activities of
the ICRC are not intentionally targeted by principled combatants for precisely
this reason. Universally respected for the humanity they bring to the face of war,
they represent no threat to the belligerents; their ability to function effectively in
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harm’s way is dependent on this vulnerability. So too, with hospital ships. Intentional attacks on hospital ships in the course of the two world wars were premised on the conviction, mistaken or otherwise, that despite their distinctive
markings and protected symbols, they were being employed in a manner harmful to the attacking side—for instance, carrying arms and ammunition, transporting combatant personnel, or transmitting intelligence. Defensive arming of
such platforms could contribute to the suspicion that some such nefarious purpose was afoot.
That leads to the second reason for reluctance to give hospital ships defensive
armament—that, as suggested earlier, it could be wrongfully employed to thwart
legitimate boarding and inspection by the opposing party. Although I am unaware of any such misuse in actual practice, the potential for abuse remains.
Clearly, the concept of reciprocity is also at play here. Were the United States to
provide its hospital ships with a defensive capability, other states could do so as
well, and perhaps with a view to misuse.
Although conventional law provides little guidance on the issue, customary
practice has made clear that any arming of hospital ships beyond side arms and
the like will be viewed with suspicion at best. The San Remo Manual’s sanctioning of “deflective means of defense” in hospital ships, such as chaff and flares, is
most welcome. However, this timid formulation remains rooted in the concept
of vulnerability. This is made clear by its accompanying explanation: “This paragraph is formulated in a way as to leave no doubt that hospital ships can only use
deflective means of defence, and not means that could be used in an offensive
fashion, such as antiaircraft guns. This is necessary to preserve the obviously in74
nocent nature of the vessel.” While the notion that antiaircraft guns installed in
hospital ships can plausibly be described as “offensive” gives pause, the manual’s
point is that vulnerability remains the sine qua non of protection.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is merit in restricting the
defensive capability of hospital ships to “deflective means” during conventional
warfare with a principled adversary, such niceties have no place in the war on
terror. As noted above, hospital ships are an attractively “soft” target for terror75
ists. Moreover, contemporary terrorist entities may have access to a variety of
weapons and weapons systems, ranging from state-of-the-art surface-to-surface
and air-to-surface missiles to unsophisticated but nonetheless deadly explosive
devices. With regard to the former, chaff and flares do provide some measure of
protection, but it would be irresponsible in the extreme to suggest that they can
be relied upon to thwart a missile attack. As to the latter, the effectiveness of unsophisticated weaponry must not be underestimated; witness the destruction of
the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.
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In this instance, the delivery means was an apparently innocent Mercedes
76
Benz stake-bed truck. The explosive mechanism was a gas-enhanced device,
probably consisting of bottled propane, butane, or acetylene, placed in proximity to a conventional explosive such as primacord, all of which are readily avail77
able on the retail market. Despite the lack of sophistication and ubiquity of its
component parts, a gas-enhanced device can be a very lethal weapon. Following
the Beirut barracks tragedy, the realization that terrorist organizations have
weapons of potentially enormous yield (the Beirut device is estimated to have
had the power of over twelve thousand pounds of TNT), deliverable by an ordinary truck or van, led to the emplacement of protective barriers around critical
government facilities throughout the United States. The appreciation that such a
formidable weapon could also be delivered by a seemingly innocent small boat
or aircraft against a target at sea led in early 1984 to specially tailored naval rules
of engagement for U.S. forces in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.
The attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, on 12 October 2000 is yet another
case in point. In that incident a smaller device, apparently consisting of four to
seven hundred pounds of C-4 military plastic explosive, detonated in a small
boat that had come alongside Cole. The blast ripped a forty-by-forty-foot hole in
Cole’s port side, killing seventeen members of the crew and injuring forty others.
Had that attack occurred at sea, Cole might have been lost. The small boat that
delivered the bomb was similar to the many boats providing various services in
the harbor. The attacks both in Beirut and on Cole were suicide missions.
The point is that the risk of terrorist attack by a small boat or aircraft against a
U.S. Navy hospital ship operating in such waters is very real. Consequently, the
decision to place .50-caliber machine guns on Comfort prior to her deployment
to the Arabian Gulf last year was sound.
That having been said, I believe it would be prudent to install more effective
defensive means on U.S. Navy hospital ships. Specifically, and unless operational
or manning considerations dictate otherwise, I propose that the Phalanx
Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) be placed in Comfort or Mercy should either
78
be again deployed in support of the war on terror. Despite the curious comment in the explanation accompanying the San Remo Manual that antiaircraft
weapons are offensive in nature, it is in my view ludicrous to suggest that Pha79
lanx is anything other than defensive.
Phalanx provides ships of the U.S. Navy with a “last-chance” defense against
anti-ship missiles and littoral warfare threats that have penetrated other fleet defenses. Phalanx automatically detects, tracks and engages anti-air warfare threats
such as anti-ship missiles and aircraft, while the Block 1B’s man-in-the-loop-system
counters the emerging littoral warfare threat. This new threat includes small, highspeed surface craft, small terrorist aircraft, helicopters and surface mines.80
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The Phalanx weapons system is essentially a Gatling gun capable of firing 20 mm
rounds at a rate of 4,500 per minute. While its effective range is classified, its
purpose, as noted, is to stop close-in, penetrating threats.
The placement of .50-caliber machine guns and the Phalanx CIWS in U.S.
Navy hospital ships obviously would constitute a departure from the “safety in
vulnerability” mind-set that heretofore has characterized our approach to the
problem. I believe that these self-defense systems will not only enhance the capability of the platform to defeat a terrorist attack but provide a deterrent effect by
announcing to terrorist entities that a U.S. Navy hospital ship may not be as
“soft” a target as generally supposed. I therefore also propose that the United
States then notify the international community that necessary and appropriate
defensive means, namely Phalanx and .50-caliber machine guns, have been installed in both Comfort and Mercy. I further suggest that the United States again
confirm its intentions to abide fully with the right of a principled adversary to
board and inspect U.S. Navy hospital ships during international armed conflict.
Moreover, doctrinal publications should be revised to reflect the view that the
defensive arming of hospital ships is fully consistent with both the letter and the
spirit of the law of armed conflict.
When one considers the impressive humanitarian capability of the Mercyclass hospital ship and the enormous psychological damage, let alone the cost in
human lives, that would be incurred if one should be lost to terrorist attack, the
case for state-of-the-art defensive capability seems apparent. The case against
rests not on any specific proscription of conventional law but upon adherence to
a vulnerability philosophy wholly unsuited to the realities of modern warfare at
sea generally or of the war on terror in particular. Heintschel von Heinegg makes
the very salient point that:
the law of naval warfare contains no rule or other provision that would justify the
conclusion that a belligerent is obliged to suffer an illegal attack or other illegal act
and to remain passive. In other words: the inherent right of self-defence that is not
abolished by any known legal order is implicitly recognized also by the law of naval
warfare. Accordingly, if there exist reasonable grounds for suspicion that hospital
ships will be the target of an illegal attack, a belligerent is entitled to take all necessary
measures to effectively prevent or counter that attack. If the only means available to
achieve that aim is the—defensive—arming of a hospital ship then this would not
constitute a violation of the law of naval warfare.81

The “Opt-Out” Option
Should the foregoing proposals prove politically unrealizable in the face of criticism by traditionalists unwilling to depart from practices and policies fashioned
for a bygone era, serious consideration should be given to “opting out.” By this I
mean abandonment of the protections accorded to hospital ships by the 1949
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Geneva (II) Convention. Much as the Royal Navy has done with RFA (Royal
Fleet Auxiliary) Argus, Comfort and Mercy could be painted haze gray and designated as primary casualty receiving and treatment platforms rather than as hos82
pital ships. The Royal Navy, apparently concluding that the emplacement of
cryptographic communications equipment and defensive armament in Argus
would be inconsistent with conventional or customary law, elected not to rate
Argus as a hospital ship within the meaning of the 1949 Convention. Instead, the
ship is configured as a “highly versatile, self-defending and helicopter-capable
PCRS [Primary Casualty Recovery Ship] rather than a dedicated HAS [Hospital
Ambulance Ship] . . . [that] must be declared under the Geneva Convention,
must be open to regular inspection, and cannot embark any military capability
83
(even self-defense weapons) of any kind.”
As noted above, a vessel devoted exclusively to the care and transport of the
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, and recognized by a principled adversary as
84
such, is not subject to intentional attack no matter what its color scheme. It
therefore would still be prudent to notify the international community of the
vessel’s name and characteristics and to make it available for boarding and inspection by a principled adversary.
I do not advocate “opting out” as the preferred solution, whether during the
war on terror or in conventional conflict with a principled adversary. However,
should it be determined that effective defensive capability cannot, for whatever
reason, be emplaced in hospital ships, it would be prudent to give that option
very serious consideration. Hospital ships adorned with white paint and displaying the protective symbol of the red cross or red crescent have a moral majesty about them that evokes the best of our humanity, even in the depths of
destruction and despair that so often accompany armed conflict. That is most
certainly worth hanging on to—but one must ask, “At what cost?”
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